State v. Hendren Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 41345 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
7-22-2014
State v. Hendren Respondent's Brief Dckt. 41345
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Hendren Respondent's Brief Dckt. 41345" (2014). Not Reported. 1604.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/1604
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ID OPY 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) No. 41345 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
) Idaho Co. Case No. 
vs. ) CR-2012-53355 
) 




BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF IDAHO 
HONORABLE MICHAEL J. GRIFFIN 
District Judge 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
JESSICA M. LORELLO 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 




DANNY J. RADAKOVICH 
Radakovick Law Office 
1624 G. Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 






TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................. iii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1 
Nature Of The Case .............................................................................. 1 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings ................................. 1 
ISSUES ............................................................................................................ 2 
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................... 3 
I. Hendren Has Failed To Show The Court Erred In 
Denying His Request To Present Irrelevant Evidence 
Regarding McNair's Alleged Prior Drug Use .............................. 3 
A. Introduction ...................................................................... 3 
B. Standard Of Review ......................................................... 3 
C. Hendren's Claimed Evidentiary Error Lacks Merit .......... .4 
II. Hendren Has Failed To Show The District Court 
Abused Its Discretion In Denying His Motion For 
A New Trial ... · ............................................................................ 14 
A. Introduction .................................................................... 14 
B. Standard Of Review ....................................................... 14 
C. The District Court Did Not Err In Denying 
Hildreth's Request For A New Trial... ............................. 14 
Ill. Hendren Has Failed To Show The Evidence 
Was Not Sufficient To Support His Conviction 
For Aggravated Battery ............................................................ 16 
A. Introduction .................................................................... 16 
B. Standard Of Review ....................................................... 17 
C. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence 
To Prove Hendren Committed An Aggravated 
Battery Against McNair .................................................. 17 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 23 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING .......................................................................... 24 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
Cagle v. State, 6 S.W.3d 801 (Ark. Ct. App. 1999) ............................................. 11 
Hake v. Delane, 117 Idaho 1058, 793 P.2d 1230 (1990) .................................. 13 
Lee v. State, 996 A.2d 425 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010) ....................................... 11 
State v. Olin, 103 Idaho 391, 648 P.2d 203 (1982) ............................................ 23 
State v. Armstrong, 142 Idaho 62, 122 P.3d 321 (Ct. App. 2005) ...................... 15 
State v. Enno, 119 Idaho 392,807 P.2d 610 (1991) .......................................... 12 
State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49,205 P.3d 1185 (2009) ........................................... 10 
State v. Hart, 112 Idaho 759, 735 P .2d 1070 (Ct. App. 1987) ............................ 17 
State v. Healy, 151 Idaho 734,264 P.3d 75 (Ct. App. 2011) ................................ 3 
State v. Hoak, 147 Idaho 919,216 P.3d 1291 (Ct. App. 2009) ............................. 4 
State v. Hoffman, 137 Idaho 897, 55 P.3d 890 (Ct. App. 2002) ......................... 22 
State v. Howell, 137 Idaho 817, 54 P.3d 460 (Ct. App. 2002) ............................ 15 
State v. Hughes, 130 Idaho 698, 946 P.2d 1338 (Ct. App. 1997) ....................... 17 
State v. Jones, 127 Idaho 478, 903 P.2d 67 (1995) ........................................... 14 
State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101,822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991) ........................ 17 
State v. Peite, 122 Idaho 809, 839 P.2d 1223 (Ct. App. 1992) ........................... 23 
State v. Pennington, 227 P.3d 978 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010) ................................... 11 
State v. Pugsley, 119 Idaho 62,803 P.2d 563 (Ct. App. 1991) .......................... 14 
State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570,826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992) ........................... 17 
State v. Roberts, 129 Idaho 194, 923 P.2d 439 (1996) ...................................... 15 
State v. Thomas, 133 Idaho 172, 983 P.2d 245 (Ct. App. 1999) ........................ 17 
iii 
State v. Thumm, 153 Idaho 533, 285 P.3d 348 (Ct. App. 2012) ......................... 13 
State v. Treio, 132 Idaho 872, 979 P.2d 1230 (1999) ......................................... 11 
State v. Wolfe, 107 Idaho 676,691 P.2d 1291 (Ct. App. 1984) .......................... 23 
STATUTES 
I.C. § 19-2406(5) ........................................................................................... 14, 15 
RULES 
I.C.R. 34 .............................................................................................................. 15 
I.R.E. 403 ............................................................................................................ 10 
I. R. E. 404 .................................................................................................... passim 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 574-75 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984) .......................... 13 
iv 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Thomas D. Hendren appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury 
verdict finding him guilty of aggravated battery. Hendren claims the district court 
committed evidentiary error and erred in denying his motion for new trial. 
Hendren also claims the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
The state charged Hendren with aggravated battery after he attacked Kirk 
McNair with a baseball bat during a confrontation between the two men. (R., 
pp.8-9, 16-17.) Hendren pied not guilty and the case proceeded to trial at which 
a jury convicted him of the charged offense. (R., pp.22-26, 52.) Hendren filed a 
motion for judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, a new trial. (R., pp.77-78.) 
The court denied Hendren's motion and entered an order withholding judgment 
and placing Hendren on probation. (R., pp.85, 95.) Hendren filed a timely notice 
of appeal. (R., pp.102-105.) 
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ISSUES 
Hendren states the issues on appeal as: 
ISSUE NO. 1: THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN 
REFUSING TO ALLOW SPECIFIC EVIDENCE AS TO WHY MR. 
HENDREN FELT THREATENED BY MR. McNAIR. 
ISSUE NO. 2: THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
ISSUE NO. 3: THE VERDICT WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY 
THE EVIDENCE, IN LIGHT OF THE PROBABLE CAUSE [sic) 
STANDARD. 
(Appellant's Initial Brief on Appeal ("Appellant's Brief"), p.6 (capitalization and 
underlining original).) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Hendren failed to show the district court committed evidentiary error 
by excluding improper unsubstantiated testimony that the victim was a drug 
user? 
2. Did the district court correctly deny Hendren's motion for a new trial, which 
motion was based on allegedly erroneous evidentiary rulings, including the ruling 
denying Hendren's request to offer improper unsubstantiated testimony about 
the victim's alleged drug use? 
3. Did the state present sufficient evidence from which the jury could 





Hendren Has Failed To Show The Court Erred In Denying His Request To 
Present Irrelevant Evidence Regarding McNair's Alleged Prior Drug Use 
A. Introduction 
At trial, Hendren twice testified that he retrieved a bat during his 
confrontation with McNair "because of the drugs." (Tr., Vol. 2, p.404, Ls.20-23, 
p.405, Ls.17-20.) After the second reference to drugs, the state objected. (Tr., 
Vol. 2, p.405, L.21.) The court sustained the objection, finding any testimony 
regarding alleged drug use was irrelevant and prejudicial; however, the court 
allowed Hendren to testify that he had a bat because he was concerned for his 
safety. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.407, L.8 - p.409, L.12.) 
On appeal, Hendren asserts the court erred in excluding evidence of "drug 
use by McNair," arguing it was relevant to why Hendren "believed that he was in 
danger." (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-9.) In a related argument, Hendren appears to 
assert the court also abused its discretion in not allowing him to develop his 
testimony on this point. (Appellant's Brief, pp.7-9.) Hendren's arguments are 
without merit. The district court correctly concluded the evidence was 
inadmissible and any failure by Hendren to develop an offer of proof regarding 
the evidence was solely attributable to him. Even if this Court concludes error 
occurred, it is harmless. 
B. Standard Of Review 
'The decision whether to admit evidence at trial is generally within the 
province of the trial court." State v. Healy. 151 Idaho 734, 736, 264 P.3d 75, 77 
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(Ct. App. 2011) (citation omitted). "[A] trial court's determination as to the 
admission of evidence at trial will only be reversed where there has been an 
abuse of that discretion." 1st 
When the appellate court reviews an evidentiary ruling for abuse of 
discretion, it conducts "a multi-tiered inquiry, examining 1) whether the lower 
court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion, 2) whether the court acted 
within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal 
standards applicable to specific choices, and 3) whether the court reached its 
decision by an exercise of reason." State v. Hoak, 147 Idaho 919,921,216 P.3d 
1291, 1293 (Ct. App. 2009) (citation omitted). 
C. Hendren's Claimed Evidentiary Error Lacks Merit 
At trial, McNair testified that he was driving by Hendren's house when he 
saw Hendren "flip[ ] him off" and heard Hendren call him a "dirty motherfucker" 
and threaten that if he "didn't move out of the neighborhood soon," Hendren was 
"going to kill [him] and the dog." (Tr., Vol. 2, p.328, Ls.16-22.) McNair said he 
drove to the end of the street and then turned around to ask Hendren what he 
had done to "make [Hendren] so angry at [him]." (Tr., Vol. 2, p.329, Ls.3-6.) 
According to McNair, once he returned to Hendren's location, Hendren continued 
to be verbally abusive and physically removed McNair from his truck and started 
hitting him with a bat. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.329, L.24 - p.334, L.15.) "At one point in 
time, [McNair] grabbed [Hendren's] arms to stop the beating, and [Hendren] 
backed off a little bit" and McNair went back to his truck, reached under the seat 
and got his gun, but put it back without taking it out of its holster and without ever 
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wielding it or pointing it at Hendren. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.334, L.18 - p.335, L.17.) In 
response, Hendren told McNair that if he was "going to pull a gun on [him]" then 
he was going to "shoot [him]." (Tr., Vol. 2, Ls.5-9.) Hendren hit McNair again 
with a bat and then Hendren's brother, Tom, appeared and hit McNair from 
behind, knocking McNair to the ground, unconscious. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.340, L.6 -
p.341, L.5, p.418, Ls.16-18, p.494, Ls.5-16.) While McNair was on the ground, 
Hendren kicked McNair, thinking he was dead. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.419, L.15 - p.420, 
L.3.) 
Hendren testified to a different version of events. Hendren claimed that it 
was McNair who "[f]lipped [him] the bird" as he drove by while Hendren was 
sitting in his truck talking on the phone. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.400, L.24 - p.401, L.13.) 
Hendren "jumped out of the truck," ran around it and "hollered at" McNair: "hey, 
asshole, come back." (Tr., Vol. 2, p.401, Ls.15-19.) As McNair was driving back 
toward Hendren, Hendren testified he "walked over to [his] pickup and pulled out 
a bat and laid it on [his] front bumper." (Tr., Vol. 2, p.403, Ls.5-8.) When 
defense counsel subsequently referenced Hendren's testimony that, when 
McNair drove up, he got his bat out, Hendren answered: "I got it out before he 
got back there because of the drugs." (Tr., Vol. 2, p.404, Ls.22-23.) The 
following exchange then occurred: 
Q: You carry a bat in your rig? 
A: Not in my truck. 
Q: Where was the bat? 
A: In my pickup. 
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Q: Okay. You got the bat out of your pickup? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Okay, and then you -- before you went to walk up to him you set 
the bat down? 
A: Even before he come up the street I laid it on the front bumper. 
Q: ... Why did you get the bat out and then lay it down? 
A: Because of the drugs, because of the meth and the prescription 
drugs these guys are on. 
(Tr., Vol. 2, p.404, L.24 - p.405, L.20.) 
The state objected after Hendren's second reference to "drugs" in relation 
to his decision to get a bat. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.405, Ls.21-23.) Outside the presence 
of the jury, the prosecutor stated the basis of the objection as improper "prior bad 
act evidence" and asked the court to instruct the jury that it should not "consider 
any comments about drugs, meth, anything like that." (Tr., Vol. 2, p.406, Ls.8-
22.) The prosecutor also noted he had not received "notice that was going to be 
brought up." (Tr., Vol. 2, p.406, Ls.23-24.) Defense counsel responded that, 
although he did not know "that's what [Hendren's] response was going to be," 
the testimony was offered to explain why Hendren "would have a bat," which he 
argued was "one of the essential elements to this" and, as such, it was a proper 
"response given the circumstances of this case and why someone would come 
back, walking back with a bat." (Tr., Vol. 2, p.407, Ls.6-14.) Defense counsel 
also explained: "[T]hat would just be what [Hendren's] belief was. I don't think 
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he has any evidence of that. That was just his belief of it." (Tr., Vol. 2, p.407, 
Ls.8-10.) The court ruled: 
The motion to strike will be granted. The Court will give a 
cautionary instruction that the jurors cannot consider it. There is a 
difference to Mr. Hendren testifying that he got the bat because he 
was afraid of physical violence from the victim versus the fact that 
he thinks the victim used drugs or was a homosexual or some other 
thing that's unrelated to the charge in this case. Drugs and use of 
drugs is unrelated to the battery charge and, therefore, is -- can 
only be used to impugn the character of the victim in this case, or 
the purported victim and, therefore, is irrelevant and does prejudice 
-- it is prejudicial. The Court will, under Rule 4404 [sic] 
subparagraph B exclude the evidence. I will give them a cautionary 
instruction the must exclude Mr. Hendren's last answer from their 
consideration. 
(Tr., Vol. 2, p.407, L.18 - p.408, L.8 (emphasis added).) 
Defense counsel then inquired whether he would be "allowed to ask Mr. 
Hendren if he had the bat because he was fearful for his safety." (Tr., Vol. 2, 
p.408, Ls.12-15.) The court answered: "If he's fearful for physical safety, yes, 
that would be relevant to the charge in this case, but not I got the because I think 
the victim is a homosexual or uses drugs or something like that." (Tr., Vol. 2, 
p.408, Ls.16-19.) Defense counsel said he understood and asked to establish 
that fact prior to the jury returning; the court agreed. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.408, Ls.20-
22.) Consequently, counsel and Hendren engaged in the following colloquy: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Mr. Hendren, did you get the bat because 
you were fearful for your safety? 
A. Yes. It was the drugs, and it really honest was. I even told the 
cop. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, just a minute. But the rationale for 
your getting the bat was you were fearful for your safety? 
A. Yeah. 
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(Tr., Vol. 2, p.408, L.23 - p.409, L.5.) 
When the jury returned, the court admonished it: 
Ladies and gentlemen, I've granted a motion to strike Mr. 
Hendren's last answer so you must put that out of your minds. 
You cannot consider it in your deliberations or think about it in any 
way, shape or form, and if you made any notes regarding his last 
answer please cross those off on your notepad. 
(Tr., Vol. 2, p.409, Ls.19-24 (emphasis added).) 
Defense counsel then asked Hendren, in the jury's presence, whether he 
had the bat because he was "fearful for [his] personal safety," and Hendren said, 
"Yeah." (Tr., Vol. 2, p.410, Ls.4-6.) Hendren next testified that he never hit 
McNair with the bat but did kick him and hit him a few times, presumably with his 
fist, after McNair hit him first. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.411, Ls. 7-12, p.418, L.20 - p.420, 
L.3.) Similar to McNair's testimony, Hendren testified the altercation ended after 
Tom attacked McNair from behind and McNair fell to the ground unconscious. 
(Tr., Vol. 2, p.420, L.6 - p.422, L.8.) 
On appeal, Hendren contends the court erred in "refusing to allow specific 
evidence as to why [he] felt threatened by Mr. McNair." (Appellant's Brief, p.7 
(capitalization and formatting altered).) In relation to this complaint, Hendren 
makes several arguments. First, Hendren asserts "[t]he court, without truly 
allowing the testimony to be developed in the absence of the jury to any great 
extent so that Mr. Hendren's thinking could be further explained, simply 
sustained the objection." (Appellant's Brief, pp.7-8; see also p.9.) This assertion 
is contradicted by the record. The court in no way deprived Hendren of an 
opportunity to "explicate[]" his "thinking." (Tr., Vol. 2, p.407, Ls.5-17.) To the 
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extent Hendren believes there was additional relevant information regarding his 
"thinking" that could have been provided, any failure to communicate such 
information rests solely with Hendren. Moreover, Hendren fails to explain to this 
Court what other information he could have offered that would have been 
relevant to the court's evidentiary ruling. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.7-8.) Any 
effort by Hendren to assign error to the district court in relation to Hendren's 
ability to provide an offer of proof should be rejected. 
Hendren's second contention is that, although the court "allow[ed] [him] to 
make the rather vanilla statement in front of the jury that he go out his bat 
because he was fearful for his safety," that testimony "wasn't especially helpful 
because there was no reason able to be given why he was fearful." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.8.) Absent a reason, Hendren complains, "it was just an unsupported 
assertion of fearfulness." (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) Hendren contends the court 
erred in not allowing him to testify that he believed McNair was on drugs and, "in 
that drugged state presented a danger" because "[w]e all see in the newspaper 
virtually daily how drug-addled people kill or injure others" and "[i]n light of that," it 
was not "unreasonable for [him] to take steps to protect himself." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.9.) Hendren's argument fails. 
Hendren's desire to testify that he believed McNair was on drugs falls 
squarely within the restrictions of I.RE. 404(b), which precludes introducing 
evidence of "other crimes, wrongs, or acts ... to prove the character of a person 
in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith." Evidence of 
other crimes, wrongs, or acts may, however, be admissible for "other purposes, 
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such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident." I.R.E. 404(b). "Admissibility of 
evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts when offered for a permitted purpose 
is subject to a two-tiered analysis." State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52, 205 P.3d 
1185, 1188 (2009). "First, the trial court must determine whether there is 
sufficient evidence to establish the other crime or wrong as fact." Id. (citations 
omitted). "The trial court must also determine whether the fact of another crime 
or wrong, if established, would be relevant" to "a material and disputed issue 
concerning the crime charged, other than propensity." Id. "Such evidence is 
only relevant if the jury can reasonably conclude that the act occurred and that 
the defendant was the actor." kl The second part of the 404(b) analysis 
requires the Court to "engage in a balancing under I.R.E. 403." kl 
Hendren could not satisfy the first step of the 404(b) analysis because he 
admittedly had no evidence that McNair was a drug user, much less sufficient 
evidence to establish it as fact. As noted by defense counsel, Hendren's 
assertion was not based on actual evidence, it was only based on a "belief." (Tr., 
Vol. 2, p.407, Ls.8-10.) Moreover, Hendren offered testimony of his belief in 
drug use only as evidence of his motive to grab the bat, not as evidence of actual 
self-defense. He did not testify, or offer any reason to conclude, that McNair was 
under the influence of drugs at the time of the crime. 
With respect to the second step of the 404(b) analysis, the court found 
evidence of Hendren's unsubstantiated belief was prejudicial and, implicitly, 
unfairly so given the court's decision to exclude it. This conclusion was correct. 
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Hendren was not legally entitled to cast unsubstantiated aspersions at McNair 
under the guise of advancing his claim of self-defense. See Lee v. State, 996 
A.2d 425, 443 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010) (noting that evidence of whether victim 
was actually "high" on drugs at the time of the murder is irrelevant to a claim of 
self-defense); State v. Pennington, 227 P.3d 978, 987-88 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010) 
(upholding the trial court's ruling excluding evidence of the victim's drug use on 
the day of the murder, but allowing the defendant to testify "as to his 
observations of the behavior of the victim"); Cagle v. State, 6 S.W.3d 801, 803 
(Ark. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding trial court's ruling excluding evidence that victim 
had methamphetamine in his system despite defendant's self-defense claim 
because the defendant was unaware that the victim was under the influence of 
methamphetamine); cf. State v. Trejo, 132 Idaho 872, 876, 979 P.2d 1230, 1234 
(1999) (Rule 404(b) does not allow for the introduction of evidence that a person 
has a "reputation of quarrelsomeness, violence, and dangerousness."). 
Hendren's third claim is that the "drug testimony could be viewed as 
character evidence" because the prosecutor, "throughout the trial, spent 
considerable time building up the character of McNair," trying to make McNair 
"look like some sort of plaster saint," and "making argument about it to the jury." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.10 (emphasis original).) According to Hendren, the "law 
appears relatively clear that, when one party chooses to use character evidence, 
then that opens it up for the opposing party to do the opposite." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.10.) Hendren relies on State v. Enno, 119 Idaho 392, 807 P.2d 610 
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(1991 ), in support of this argument. (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Hendren 
misunderstands the law. 
The "plaster saint" building character evidence Hendren cites is McNair's 
own testimony regarding his volunteer work at Valley Bible Church (Tr., Vol. 2, 
p.326, Ls.7-20), and the Kamiah Food Club (Tr., Vol. 2, p.327, Ls.4-20), and his 
testimony that he decided not to take out his gun when being attacked by 
Hendren because he is a "Christian" who does not "want to take a human life" 
(Tr., Vol. 2, p.335, Ls.18-23). (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Asking questions that 
personalize a witness does not open the door to evidence that is otherwise 
prohibited under the rules. Enno does not hold otherwise, nor does any other 
case of which the state is aware. 
"In his testimony Enno stated that he was not a violent person and never 
hurt anyone." Enno, 119 Idaho at 407, 807 P.2d at 625. However, the 
prosecutor, in closing argument, "suggested that Enno was a violent person" 
based on certain evidence including that Enno was a "bodyguard for a 'bad 
character."' kl Enno complained about the argument on appeal. The Court 
held that, because Enno testified he was not a violent person, under 1.R.E. 404, 
the state was "allowed to rebut that evidence." kl This conclusion does not 
translate to the facts of Hendren's case. 
Rule 404(a) allows the accused to offer evidence of a "pertinent trait of 
character" of himself or the victim, and the prosecutor may rebut such evidence. 
I.R.E. 404(a)(1)-(2). Neither the rule nor Enno support the proposition, implicitly 
or explicitly, that an accused can rebut evidence regarding a victim's volunteer 
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work with evidence that the accused believes the victim does drugs. Real, 
imagined, or perceived drug use is not a character trait, it is a "crime, wrong, or 
act," the admissibility of which is governed by I.R.E. 404(b). See Hake v. 
Delane, 117 Idaho 1058, 793 P.2d 1230 (1990) (quoting MCCORMICK ON 
EVIDENCE 574-75 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984)) ("Character is a generalized 
description of a person's disposition, or of the disposition in respect to a general 
trait, such as honesty, temperance or peacefulness."). As previously explained, 
Hendren's belief that McNair used drugs was not admissible under 1.R.E. 404(b). 
Even if this Court concludes the district court erred in preventing Hendren 
from testifying about his unsubstantiated belief that McNair used drugs, any error 
was harmless. An error "will be deemed harmless if the appellate court is able to 
declare, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable possibility 
that the event complained of contributed to the conviction." State v. Thumm, 153 
Idaho 533, 537, 285 P.3d 348, 352 (Ct. App. 2012) (citation omitted). This Court 
can easily conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that any error was harmless. 
First, and most importantly, although the district court instructed the jury 
not to consider Hendren's "last" answer to the question, "Why did you get the bat 
out and then lay it down?," which was "Because of the drugs, because of the 
meth and the prescription drugs these guys are on," Hendren had already 
testified, without objection, that he got his bat out "because of the drugs." (Tr., 
Vol. 2, p.404, Ls.22-23.) Thus, the very evidence he claims the jury was 
prevented from considering was already admitted and not stricken because there 
was no objection. 
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Beyond that, there was substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict 
that Hendren committed an aggravated battery and that battery was not justified 
as self-defense. The reasons for this are set forth more fully in subsection 111, 
supra, in response to Hendren's claim that there was insufficient evidence to 
support his conviction. Hendren's claim that the court committed evidentiary 
error fails. 
II. 
Hendren Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Denying His Motion For A New Trial 
A Introduction 
Hendren claims error in the district court's denial of his motion for a new 
trial. Application of the correct legal standards to the grounds on which Hendren 
sought a new trial shows the district court properly denied the motion. Hendren 
has failed to show otherwise. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Granting or denying a motion for a new trial is within the district court's 
discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing that the court 
abused that discretion. State v. Jones, 127 Idaho 478, 481, 903 P.2d 67, 70 
(1995); State v. Pugsley, 119 Idaho 62, 63, 803 P.2d 563, 564 (Ct. App. 1991). 
C. The District Court Did Not Err In Denying Hildreth's Request For A New 
Trial 
Idaho law permits a district court to order a new trial if the court has "erred 
in the decision of any question of law arising during the course of the trial." I.C. § 
14 
19-2406(5). Idaho Criminal Rule 34 outlines the standard that the trial court 
applies when considering a motion for a new trial, directing that "[t]he court ... 
may grant a new trial to the defendant if required in the interest of justice." 
Whether the interests of justice require a new trial is a question that is committed 
to the discretion of the trial court, and its decision will not be disturbed absent a 
showing of manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Armstrong, 142 Idaho 62, 64, 
122 P.3d 321, 323 (Ct. App. 2005). When a district court orders a new trial 
based on I. C. § 19-2406(5), a reviewing appellate court will determine first 
whether the evidentiary ruling at trial in question was erroneous, and, if so, 
whether that error was harmless, i.e., whether the Court is confident beyond a 
reasonable doubt that, had the evidentiary error not occurred, the verdict would 
have been the same. State v. Howell, 137 Idaho 817, 820-821, 54 P.3d 460, 
463-464 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing State v. Roberts, 129 Idaho 194, 923 P.2d 439 
(1996)). Therefore, a district court manifestly abuses its discretion if it orders a 
new trial pursuant to I.C. § 19-2406(5), if either: (1) the evidentiary ruling at trial 
in question was not erroneous, or (2) the evidentiary ruling at trial in question 
was erroneous, but the error was harmless. 
Hendren cited two bases In his motion for new trial (and alternative 
request for an acquittal): (1) error in "sustaining objection to and/or striking 
evidence of [his] belief as to drug use by the purported victim," and, (2) "[t]he 
verdict does not comport with the evidence." (R., p.77.) The court denied 
Hendren's motion, reaffirming its evidentiary ruling and rejecting Hendren's claim 
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that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. (Tr., Vol. 3, p.604, 
L.17 - p.606, L.3.) 
On appeal, Hendren argues that the district court erred in denying his 
motion for a new trial on evidentiary grounds for the same reasons "discussed in 
[his] argument of Issue 1 on appeal, i.e. that the court made a mistake in its 
handling of the question of Mr. Hendren's intention of testifying the McNair's [sic] 
drug involvement." (Appellant's Brief, p.12.) Accordingly, the state incorporates 
its response to that argument with respect to Hendren's claim that the court erred 
in denying his motion for a new trial. Because Hendren has failed to show the 
court committed evidentiary error, much less reversible evidentiary error, his 
claim that the court erred in denying his motion for a new trial on this same basis 
also fails. 
111. 
Hendren Has Failed To Show The Evidence Was Not Sufficient To Support His 
Conviction For Aggravated Battery 
A. Introduction 
Hendren contends the state failed to present sufficient evidence to 
support his conviction for aggravated battery. Hendren's argument fails. 
Application of the correct legal standards to the evidence presented shows the 
state presented sufficient evidence from which the jury could find, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that Hendren was guilty of committing an aggravated battery 
against McNair. 
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8. Standard Of Review 
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered 
upon a jury verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of 
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt. State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. 
Hart, 112 Idaho 759, 761, 735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987). In conducting 
this review the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to 
the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the 
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. State v. Knutson, 121 
Idaho 101,822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991); Hart, 112 Idaho at 761,735 P.2d at 
1072. Moreover, the facts, and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are 
construed in favor of upholding the jury's verdict. State v. Hughes, 130 Idaho 
698, 701, 946 P.2d 1338, 1341 (Ct. App. 1997); Hart, 112 Idaho at 761, 735 
P.2d at 1072. 
C. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence To Prove Hendren Committed 
An Aggravated Battery Against McNair 
Hendren claims the evidence presented to the jury was insufficient to 
convict him of aggravated battery. (Appellant's Brief, pp.12-14.) This claim was 
twice rejected by the district court and should again be rejected on appeal. 
"On review, this Court will not reweigh the significance of the evidence as 
it relates to specific elements but will merely examine the supporting evidence." 
State v. Thomas, 133 Idaho 172, 174, 983 P.2d 245, 247 (Ct. App. 1999) 
(citation omitted). "Evidence is sufficient to support a verdict where there is 
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substantial, even if conflicting, evidence from which a rational trier of fact could 
find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." kl 
Further, this Court "will not substitute our view for that of the jury as to witness 
credibility, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the reasonable inferences 
to be drawn from the evidence" and the "Court will defer to the jury's 
determinations of the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the 
testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence." kl 
At the conclusion of the state's case-in-chief, Hendren moved for a 
judgment of acquittal, arguing the state's "version of events" was "simply 
incredible" and there was "not sufficient evidence for th[e] matter to go forward." 
(Tr., Vol. 2, p.393, Ls.10-17.) The court denied the motion, stating: "Considering 
all the evidence the Court has heard to this point there is substantial competent 
evidence the jury, if they did believe it, could find the defendant guilty of the 
charge." (Tr., Vol. 2, p.394, L.25 - p.395, L.4.) 
After trial, Hendren again sought an acquittal, arguing there was "enough 
conflicting evidence that there is a reasonable doubt as a matter of law." (Tr., 
Vol. 3, p.596, Ls.13-16.) The court again disagreed: 
Quite frankly, if they just believe Mr. McNair without the other 
witnesses and didn't believe any other witness there would be 
sufficient evidence. But the other witnesses, of course, 
corroborated some of the things that Mr. McNair said, not 
everything, but some of the things that he testified to. I think there 
is substantial and competent evidence to support the verdict. The 
motion for acquittal will be denied. 
(Tr., Vol. 3, p.604, L.22 - p.605, L. 5) 
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The district court was exactly right. The court instructed the jury that, in 
order to find Hendren guilty of aggravated battery, it must find the state proved 
the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 
1. On or about August 18, 2012 
2. in the state of Idaho 
3. Thomas Dale Hendren committed a battery upon Kirk F. 
McNair, 
4. by hitting Kirk F. McNair with a baseball bat, and 
5. when doing so the defendant used a deadly weapon or 
instrument. 
(R., p.32 (Instruction No. 2).) The court further instructed the jury on the 
elements of self-defense. (R., p.44 (Instruction No. 11).) 
As noted by the district court, it was well within the jury's province to 
convict Hendren based solely on McNair's testimony. (Tr., Vol. 3, p.604, Ls.22-
25.) Hendren claims otherwise, citing conflicts between McNair's testimony and 
the testimony of another state's witness, Ben Sedgwick. (Appellant's Brief, 
p.13.) Hendren also relies on the testimony of his own witnesses, suggesting 
those witnesses' testimony should be given greater weight because they 
supposedly "actually observed the action [and] did not see any beating with the 
bat." (Appellant's Brief, p.13.) Hendren's arguments are without merit. 
First, McNair, who was the victim of "the action" certainly was in a position 
to "observe" it and Sedgwick also testified that he saw "the action" and both men 
testified that Hendren struck McNair with a baseball bat. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.276, 
Ls.13-25, p.331, Ls.20-22.) The conflicts between their testimony that Hendren 
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believes establishes reasonable doubt are that Sedgwick "detailed far less [sic] 
blows with the bat than what Mr. McNair claimed" and that Sedgwick's 
"testimony involved the hitting with the bat not starting until after McNair had 
closed the door of his pickup and that ties in with McNair's admission that he 
had gone into the cab area of his pickup and pulled out a gun, which he put 
back without discharging it." (Appellant's Brief, p.13.) Exactly how these 
alleged conflicts create reasonable doubt that Hendren committed an 
aggravated battery is a mystery. Even assuming there was a discrepancy 
between the number of "blows" testified to by McNair as opposed to Sedgwick, 
any such discrepancy not only fails to establish reasonable doubt, it is ultimately 
irrelevant since aggravated battery does not require a certain number of "blows" 
in order to convict - one is plenty. Moreover, the conflicts Hendren relies upon 
are not evident from the record. McNair testified that Hendren pulled him from 
the truck, hit him with the bat, then McNair returned to the truck, reached under 
the seat, looked at his gun but put it back and then exited his truck at which time 
Hendren struck him with the bat again. (Tr., Vol. 2, pp.330-337.) Sedgwick's 
testimony was that he saw McNair close his driver's door and then saw Hendren 
hit McNair with the bat. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.276, Ls.13-20.) This testimony does not 
clearly conflict with McNair's because Sedgwick could have been referring to 
what he saw after McNair went back to his truck to look at his gun, which would 
explain why he did not observe the "blows" preceding that. Regardless, as 
noted, any conflict between McNair's and Sedgwick's testimony falls far short of 
establishing the evidence was insufficient. See Thomas, supra. 
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Hendren's reliance on the testimony of "his" witnesses is also inadequate 
to show Hendren is entitled to an acquittal. Hendren himself admitted having a 
bat, but denied hitting McNair with it. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.412, Ls.19-20, p.418, Ls.20-
22.) The jury understandably rejected this testimony as not credible given 
McNair's physical injuries and both McNair's and Sedgwick's testimony to the 
contrary. As for Hendren's reliance on "his" witnesses, his claim that they 
"actually observed the action" is overstated. (Appellant's Brief, p.13.) Hendren's 
mother testified that she looked out the window, saw McNair hit Hendren, and 
"wouldn't be able to quite say" what happened after that. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.470, 
Ls.1-15.) Notably, Ms. Hendren denied ever seeing a bat; a point directly 
contrary to Hendren's own admissions. (Tr., Vol. 2, L.469, Ls.22-25, p.471, 
Ls.22-23.) 
Hendren's other witness was his brother, Fred. Fred testified that McNair 
had Hendren "by the chest," was "freaking out," "tripping out" and "hollering and 
screaming," so Tom "dove through the air and threw [his] arm around [McNair's 
neck," "punched him two or three times" and fled because he thought he may 
have killed McNair. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.491, L.18 - p.492, L.15, p.494, Ls.12-23.) In 
terms of conflicting evidence, Tom's version was even quite different than 
Hendren's. Hendren certainly did not describe McNair as the hysterical person 
depicted by Tom. Hendren's version of the contact initiated by McNair was that 
McNair hit him first, took off his glasses, and poked him in the eyes with his 
fingers, then Hendren hit Mcnair "a few times in the guts and stuff," which is 
when Fred came over and jumped on McNair and "that was the end of it" - until, 
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of course, Hendren kicked or "moved" McNair as he was lying on the ground like 
he was dead. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.415, L.7 - p.419, L.18.) Interestingly, Ms. Hendren, 
one of Hendren's witnesses who supposedly "actually observed the action" not 
only never saw a bat, she also denied seeing Fred attack McNair. (Tr., Vol. 2, 
p.471, Ls.24-25.) Even if the testimony Hendren presented in his defense was 
not inconsistent and unbelievable, it was up to the jury whether to find it credible; 
clearly it did not. 
Further, it is hardly surprising that the jury rejected Hendren's claim of 
self-defense. In addition to the testimony from McNair and Sedgwick, Douglas 
Schroeder testified that, on the date of the aggravated battery, he saw McNair 
lying on the ground while Hendren, who was holding a bat, stood over the top of 
him. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.214, Ls.3-23.) Hendren was yelling at McNair as McNair was 
lying on the ground, and Hendren "rolled" McNair over using his foot. (Tr., Vol. 1, 
p.215, L.21 - p.216, L.15.) Schroeder testified that McNair was angry, "red in 
the face," and had no visible injuries. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.216, L.21 - p.217, L.3.) Law 
enforcement who interviewed Hendren similarly testified that Hendren was "very 
agitated" and the only injury he had was a scratch on his neck that was 
consistent with a defensive wound. (Tr., .Vol. 1, p.105, Ls.11-18, p.106, Ls.13-
15, p.114, Ls.10-13.) McNair's injuries on the other hand were rather serious 
and required overnight hospitalization for observation. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.112, L.17 -
p.113, L.22, p.188, L.3 - p.193, L.5; Exhibits 1-4.) It was for the jury to decide 
whether Hendren acted in self-defense; the jury's clear conclusion that he did not 
does not show the evidence was insufficient. Compare State v. Hoffman, 137 
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Idaho 897, 902, 55 P.3d 890, 895 (Ct. App. 2002) ("This evidence, when viewed 
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, provided the jury a reasonable 
basis to reject Hoffman's 'attempted suicide' defense and to conclude that he 
intentionally used the weapon to shoot Montoya."); see also State v. Olin, 103 
Idaho 391, 398, 648 P.2d 203, 210 (1982) Uury entitled to reject claim of self-
defense); State v. Peite, 122 Idaho 809, 823, 839 P.2d 1223, 1237 (Ct. App. 
1992) (rejecting defendant's claim that evidence was insufficient because he did 
not think victim's testimony was credible); State v. Wolfe, 107 Idaho 676, 679, 
691 P.2d 1291, 1294 (Ct. App. 1984) ("The jury was entitled to reject the defense 
counsel's contention that Wolfe was too intoxicated to form the intent to kill or to 
premeditate the killing."). 
Not only was the evidence against Hendren sufficient, it was 
overwhelming. Hendren's sufficiency of the evidence claim fails and any 
evidentiary error is harmless. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered 
upon the jury verdict finding Hendren guilty of aggravated battery. 
DATED this 22nd day of July, 2014. 
uty Attorney General 
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